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| Peruvian President Ollanta Humala delivers a speech in rural Puno. Humala ran on a campaign with ethnonationalist tones. He is currently serving a 15 year sentence for his involvement in the Odebrecht scandal, the largest corruption scandal in Latin American history. © Presidency of Peru, 2015 |
This article is a small survey of parallel systems of justice in rural and remote areas of Peru, a country with which I am intimately familiar. Over the course of this piece I will go through the circumstances that led to the formation of such systems, their current status, and some of their worst excesses. Peru is not the United States. Its geography, history, and demographics are radically different. The underlying conditions that produced these parallel systems are not, however, unique to Peru. It is worth asking what fills a vacuum when the courts do not play a role. In Peru, we have some answers. Whether the same questions in rural America would ever be answered in like manner to Peru is for the reader to imagine.
The geographical roots of legal absence
Peru's geography represents a major obstacle to the nation's political integration and by extension, to its legal system. Peru is vertically split in half by the Andes mountain region, it is flanked on its east by the Amazon rainforest and on its west by the Pacific Ocean. Peru's capital of Lima holds 1/3 of the nation's population. The result of this is an extremely centralized nation, dominated by its political and economic coastal elites. Its mountainous terrain makes transportation quite difficult as well, with some highways like the infamous Serpentine of Pasamayo (an extremely narrow 14 mile stretch of highway which has mountain on one side and abyss on the other) being the only way to make way through the country.
In many remote areas, especially in the Andes, there is very little formal policing. The courts are a distant, nonoperative institution. Language barriers do not help either, as about 15% of Peru's population speaks Quechua as their main language, but much of the population, and especially those working in government, do not speak it at all. Historically, communities in such areas have governed themselves with little involvement from the central or even regional government. Often, they handled disputes through informal assemblies or through respected community leaders. The first rondas campesinas (meaning "peasant patrols") were established in the northern Andean region of Cajamarca, in the late 1970s. These early rondas were primarily created to deal with property crimes (the main one being cattle theft).
Sendero Luminoso and the militarization of the rondas
In May 1980, the Maoist terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (literally "Shining Path"), a primarily rural Andean movement, declared war on the Peruvian government. It was led by Abimael Guzman, a professor of philosophy at a university in Ayacucho (a region in the south Andes). Part of Sendero's strategy was what they called "batir el campo" (meaning "scouring the countryside", destroying all non-Sendero authority in such regions). Initially, many rural communities sided with Sendero, agreeing with their message of discontent against the neglect the government had for the people of the Andes. When confronted with the violent revolts happening in the Andes, President Fernando Belaunde dismissed them, assessing the threat as nothing more than small issues with cattle rustlers. Sendero held "people's trials" against those it considered "antirevolutionary elements". The subject of these trials were often community leaders, and the price of resistance was massacre. The most notorious of these was the Lucanamarca massacre of 1983, in which over 60 people (ranging from ages of 6 months to 70 years of age) were killed with machetes and axes, in retaliation for the killing of one of Sendero's commanders. What followed were years of massacres in the Andes, with much of the human cost falling on the rural communities that lived there.
Eventually, in the early 1990s, the Peruvian government found its footing in the fight against Sendero, and the war started to turn. Under the leadership of President Alberto Fujimori, the rondas started being armed and supported by the government. This cooperation proved instrumental in defeating Sendero in rural regions, and displacing them into other areas where the government had an easier time fighting them. On September 12, 1992, Sendero's leader Abimael Guzman was captured in a safehouse in an upper class neighborhood in Lima, where he was being hosted by a wealthy classical dancer. That was game over.
Constitutional recognition
After the inflection point of Guzman's capture, Fujimori moved forward with a series of reforms. Chief among them was the Peruvian Constitution of 1993. In its Article 149, the constitution recognizes the authority of the rondas campesinas within their jurisdictions, as long as they "respect the fundamental rights of people". The same article calls for the cooperation of the "traditional" judicial power and these parallel systems of justice in the future.
How the project of cooperation and respect for the fundamental rights of people is going is difficult to assess with precision. But, where statistics are scarce, it is always good to tell a story.
A Canadian in Ucayali
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| The village of Nuevo Jerusalen in the Ucayali Region of Peru. A village such as this was where the events described below took place. © Vratislav S, 2012 |
Gerardo's choice
If you are in any way like me, you may have heard the story and said to yourself, "only one way to avoid a similar fate, stay as far away as possible from that region if you are not a local." However, this is not a solution. In 2007, in the village of Patascachi (near the border with Bolivia, population around 1000), a mob descended upon the house of Gerardo Parisuana, a farmer. Nearly the entire town was there. The occasion? Gerardo's son Gary was accused of being a cattle rustler, and the mob had had enough of him. The evidence against him? A gang of cattle rustlers, upon capture, had accused Gary of being their leader. The police arrested Gary, but found insufficient evidence to hold him and released him shortly after. For the rondas, however, the "trial" had already happened, the verdict was in, and there was no room for appeals. Gerardo now had a choice: to lynch his own son, or to have the rest of his family share his son's fate. Gerardo made his choice. According to witnesses, the crowd tortured Gary before Gerardo hanged him.
The mayor on trial
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| A sign near the city of Ilave, in the Puno Region. The city of Ilave is at an elevation of over 12 thousand feet above sea level. © TeshTesh, 2015 |
Conclusion
The rondas campesinas are not just a series of horror stories. They emerged from genuine necessity. They fulfilled a role that no one else could. They even have constitutional recognition. But the results they tend to generate speak for themselves. Formal policing and legal institutions are not perfect, but they tend to produce something different.
Peru is not the United States. The Andes are not Appalachia. The Amazon is not the Ozarks. But legal vacuums do not know borders, and the dynamics that fill them may follow recognizable patterns. Whether those patterns may ever extend to America is, as said in the introduction, for the reader to imagine.

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1 comment:
The rondas campesinas unfortunately seem like an all-too-common phenomenon when there is a lack of oversight by a centralized authority. For example, witch hunts occurred most often in parts of Europe and the English colonies with minimal government centralization (parts of the Holy Roman Empire, the Protestant kingdoms, Puritan New England). In many or most cases, accusations of witchcraft were petty and bald attempts to seize a neighbor's property. At the same time, the more well organized and procedural Spanish Inquisition almost always threw out allegations of witchcraft, relying on well-established theology dating back to Saint Augustine of Hippo to reason that witchcraft was literally impossible. In the case of medieval anti-Jewish pogroms, it was usually a poorly organized mob attacking Jewish communities while the more educated authorities like the local bishop, the king, or sometimes even the Pope himself would attempt to stop the massacres. Organic and historical policing actions have frequently devolved into mob terror without institutional oversight. My instinct is that the people who seek out power are often the ones who least should have it because they are the most motivated to use that power against their peers. The volunteer nature of las rondas campesinas might feed into this urge to establish oneself as an authority figure in one's own locality. I am not an expert on Peruvian history, but would rural populations instead be better served by the presence of a non-local garrison of professional police or soldiers? Again, from history, it could be something like how the Spanish Empire would establish presidios, frontier forts only available to professional soldiers, to protect the local population from hit & run attacks in the Mediterranean, Northern Mexico, and the Philippine Islands.
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